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Abstract  
Non-profit organisations are under increasing pressure to demonstrate their social impact. 
This paper examines the experience and behaviour of non-profit organisations in the UK 
in relation to a demand for impact evaluations. It shows that organisations both accept 
and resist control, and use evaluations for promotional purposes. External resource 
providers request organisations to present evidence on how resources are used and what 
organisations have achieved.  However, non-profit organisations can also proactively use 
social impact measurement as a way of exerting control over their environment through 
using their discretion in deciding what to measure, how to measure and what to report. 
The analysis uses a combination of the concepts acceptance, rejection, compliance and 
strategic decoupling to distinguish different organisational responses to external demands 
for impact evaluation.  
 





There is a growing interest amongst non-profit organisations in approaches to measure 
their social impact. While control can be exercised by outside resource holders, there is 
also a need to understand the responses of organisations themselves.  This paper 
examines the experience and behaviour of non-profit organisations (charities, social 
enterprises), in the UK, in relation to evaluation and performance measurements. 
Auditing and performance measurements can be presented as means of controlling staff 
and organisations. The control can be exercised formally and directly, through evaluation 
requirements linked to contracts, and it can be exercised indirectly, through norms where 
individuals and organisations seek approval and verification (Power, 1999).  However, 
there is emerging evidence that organisations are not seeing the practice of evaluation as 
simply a form of compliance to resource holders (Pritchard et al, 2012). This paper shows 
how organisations both accept and actively resist control, with many organisations using 
the evaluation process for promotional purposes.  
 
At present, UK social purpose organisations find themselves under a new auditing regime 
introduced through new social policies (Department of Health, 2011; HM Government, 
2012) and philanthropic funding arrangements (Pritchard et al, 2012), where auditing is 
linked to accountability, legitimacy and competition for resources. Social auditing and 
accountability controlled by outside stakeholders (Ebrahim, 2003, 2005), and conducted 
with the purpose of managing and mediating competition in the field of care and social 
mission, is causing discomfort (Turco, 2012). There is also fear that the auditing process, 
with ensuing performance management, has detrimental effects on organisational culture 
and staff morale (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Hwang & Powell, 2004; Townley, 
2011).   
 
  
This paper makes a contribution to the understanding of how evaluation and social 
impact measurement is part of  organisational strategy, with  a difference between what 
organisations are asked to do, what they say they are doing, and  what they are doing in 
practice. The concept of decoupling describes how organisations ‘make visible, public 
commitments to satisfy the demands of their external environment’ while the 
organisation’s internal operations can follow different trajectories (Turco, 2012, p. 386). 
Decoupling can be seen as a way of managing the dilemma of  resisting external 
monitoring (Levay & Waks, 2009) combined with a wish to gain legitimacy from the 
very same external context. The study shows how organisations aim to reconcile such 
underlying conflicts without upsetting relations with stakeholders. 
 
Based on interviews with individuals representing social purpose organisations the paper 
examines how social accounting can be used by resource holders to exert control over 
funded organisations. The paper goes on to argue that there is a need to go beyond 
conceptualisation of evaluation as a form of control by those providing funding over 
those providing the impact. An alternative, or additional, view can see evaluation or 
social accounting as a space of resistance.  
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The paper illustrates how non-profit organisations are being shaped by the influence of 
logics and norms held by other parties. With an emphasis on the role of agency, it also 
illustrates how organisations manage to subvert this power. The concept of decoupling 
can suitably describe some of the actions taken by organisations. The paper explores how 
organisations respond to requests for evaluation, and how strategic decoupling is 
developed. The study suggests that organisations who engage in evaluation do so with a 
dual purpose. On the one hand they do so to comply with social audit norms and thereby 
ascertain organisational legitimacy and survival. On the other, they engage in this with 
the view to protect and use a room for manoeuvre that allows them a level of 
independence as well as influence over how the performance of social purpose 
organisations is understood and measured. In order to describe the processes surrounding 
these strategies, the paper explores motivations to comply and the sources of discomfort 
and tensions experienced by organisations, as a basis for understanding different 
intentionalities that guide decoupling. 
 
Evaluation as a control measure 
Pressure on non-profit organisations for more rigorous impact measurement and reporting 
can come from a range of stakeholders. These include the clients, other social purpose 
organisations, and so called patrons (Ebrahim, 2003). However these §stakeholders have 
diverse ideas about what and how activities should be measured (Kendall & Knapp, 
2000). This, together with the nature of social impact being hard to define (Barman, 
2007), makes for an interesting arena in which power and control can be both exercised 
and negotiated.  
 
Patrons or funders are often found to have more influence than others resulting in an 
emphasis on ‘accountability upwards’ (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 314). This pattern of 
asymmetric power relations is becoming more prevalent across the world as grant making 
and philanthropy is moving from a previous position of a ‘fund it and forget it’ approach 
(Leat, 2006) to a view that sees funding as an investment that requires understanding of 
‘value for money’ (Ostrander, 2007). In many cases organisations are under contractual 
obligations to report achievements to grant or contract providers. Requests for 
evaluations and performance reporting are seen as a way for funders to manage the 
performance of organisations without having to manage the organisations themselves 
(Paton, 2003, p.14). 
 
There is relatively little research on the behaviour of non-profit organisations in relation 
to performance measurement, including the effect of control and disciplining exercised 
by resource providers. Studies of international nongovernment organisations (NGOs) 
show that the way these organisations behave in relation to financial and social auditing 
can be strongly related to the power of outsiders (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2007). Ebrahim (2002) argues that power asymmetry is an essential component that 
influences the way NGOs experience new accountability regimes. The meaning of 
information, suggests Ebrahim, is both symbolic and strategic and although organisations 
show resistance, their behaviour results in the reinforcement of this asymmetric 
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relationship. In a study of Belgian NGOs, compliance with rules of transparency is 
explained through resource dependence and coercive isomorphism (Verbruggen, 
Christiaens & Milis, 2011). 
 
Discomfort and resistance 
Evaluations as surveillance, with the possibility of disciplining, controlled by outside 
stakeholders cause discomfort among groups that are at the receiving end of this control. 
The experience and response to this takes different forms depending, among other things, 
on the nature of this discomfort and what room for manoeuvre the situation offers. 
Transparency based on measurable indicators and audits made accessible to outside 
stakeholders can support the appreciation of some aspects of work. But it also threatens 
the autonomy of staff and organisations, and this causes anxiety and discomfort (Levay & 
Waks, 2009; Lipsky, 1980). Discomfort also comes from the way evaluations are framed 
and the conflicting values they may present to organisations and their staff. O’Neill 
describes how an encompassing audit culture, aimed at restoring trust in institutions, both 
‘distort[s] the proper aim of professional practice’ and ‘damage[s] professional pride and 
integrity’ (2002, p. 50). Similarly Hwang and Powell (2009, p. 268) report on loss in core 
organisational values that come as a result of ‘the integration of professional ideals’, 
some of which are related with evaluation practices. This illustrates discomfort caused by 
tensions within the organisation as well as in relation to external actors caused by the 
introduction of evaluation and performance management. 
 
Although there is asymmetry in allocation of power based on resources, this paper 
examines the responses of organisations to demands for evaluations and explores how 
those receiving funds can also exert power in the form of resistance to controls proposed 
by others (Clegg, 1989). Evaluation practices can be used to actively shape the 
organisational environment and challenge authorities (Asdal, 2011). Key to 
understanding organisations’ behaviour in the context of non-profit organisations is the 
discretion, or room for manoeuvre, offered at various points in the social impact 
evaluation process. One may assume that there is greater opportunity to make use of 
discretion with the purpose of subverting power when there are contested discourses of 
what is deemed ‘social’. This paper understands social impact as a social construction: 
there is no clear definition of what is meant by ‘social’ and consequently there is 
discretion involved when social impact is assessed (Barman, 2007; Lyon & Sepulveda, 
2009; Hall, 2012). This provides room for organisations to forward particular 
interpretations of the concept through their evaluations. 
 
While there is evidence that funders and other resource holders exert control through 
directives related to evaluation, others highlight that organisations may hide information, 
control the flow of information, or provide information that misrepresents activities and 
achievements (Burger & Owens, 2010). Burger and Owens (2010) suggest that this is a 
‘deflection strategy’ used by organisations to cope with control imposed by stakeholders 
that hold unrealistic expectations, and to cope with a competitive climate. Based on a 
study of five social enterprises in the UK, Nicholls argues that evaluations and audits are 
used as means to ‘enhance social mission rather than merely to respond to regulation’ 
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(2009, p. 756) and suggests that ‘emergent reporting practices constitute a spectrum of 
disclosure logics that social entrepreneurs exploit strategically to support their various 
mission objectives with key stakeholders’ (p. 756). Here, impact measurement is part of 
the process of negotiation between stakeholders and can be seen as a symbolic mediator. 
In another study Nicholls shows how a ‘flexible reporting format can be used 
strategically in various ways by companies according to their particular objectives and 
resource limitations’ (2010, p. 407). Discretion, embedded in such a flexible format, can 
be seen as a key element of social entrepreneurial activity, with organisations providing 
different information for different audiences as they reach their objectives through 
impression management (Guillamon-Saoring, 2011; Teasdale, 2010). 
 
Decoupling 
The research reviewed above suggests that, faced with competing demands, non-profit 
organisations seek different ways of avoiding and coping with potential conflicts that 
may arise both internally within the organisation, and in relations with external 
stakeholders. There is a need for analysis that unpicks organisational strategies used in 
situations of power asymmetries and competing demands. The concept of decoupling is 
used to explore this space.  
 
Decoupling conveys an understanding that rational plans seldom correlate with what 
actually goes on in organisations (Weick, 1976). Rather than seeing organisations as sets 
of controlled activities we appreciate that they encompass highly complex relations and 
policies that are not easily coordinated (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The conceptualision of 
decoupling has shifted over time, moving from simply pointing out a discrepancy 
between plans and action, to asking questions about the source and motivation of 
decoupling and what different types of decoupling processes we may encounter. We 
therefore introduce a perspective on organisational behaviour that considers 
organisational actions and strategies in relation to powerful audiences and internal 
organisational dynamics (Pache and Santos, 2010; Sandholtz, 2012). Decoupling is for 
example described as an action that aims to show compliance with norms of transparency 
to an outside audience, while at the same time also preventing full insight and in order to 
protect professional autonomy (Levay & Waks, 2009). Words such as concealment 
(Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009), resistance (Levay & Waks, 2009), and symbolic compliance 
(Sandholtz, 2012) suggest a defensive motivation for a decoupling of system from action. 
A slightly different take on the process is presented by Hirsch and Bermiss (2009) who 
use ‘strategic decoupling’, which implies more proactive agency in a decoupling process 
where actors use decoupling to ‘creatively navigate’ change. Such an engaged way 
decoupling is also expressed in Pache and Santo’s (2010, p. 463) ‘manipulation’ where, 
for example, the organisation tries to ‘influence the definition of norms’ or to ‘control the 
source of pressure’ they may find themselves subject to.  
 
The act of decoupling directs focus to the nature of relations between the organisation 
and outside stakeholders, where typically external actors seek control (Levay and Waks, 
2009; Sandholtz, 2012). In a recent study by Turco (2012), the author shows how 
decoupling reflects conflicts that come from outside as well as within the organisation 
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and had a two-fold purpose. Firstly, as a way of complying with values that were not 
easily reconciled, (such as values of the commercial market on the one hand and the 
norms of providing care on the other). Secondly, decoupling was used to contain conflicts 
between groups of staff that represent different sides in the conflict caused by competing 
demands. 
 
Using decoupling as a conceptual point of departure supports a call for institutionalist 
approaches to better recognise agency in organisations (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 
2009; Tracey, 2011). Decoupling summarises a range of responses that are different in 
nature and that emerge over time, and studies of organisational behaviour increasingly 
seek ways of moving beyond an analysis that simply views decoupling ‘in binary terms 
as being either present or absent (Sandholtz, 2012, p.659). Pache and Santos (2010) 
discuss a ‘repertoire of responses’ (p. 462) and use the nature of demands and internal 
representation as the two key points of departure when explaining different types of 
organisational responses to conflicting demands.  
 
This paper therefore explores organisational responses, including decoupling by firstly 
looking at the nature of the relationship between non-profit organisations and external 
stakeholders, with associated power asymmetries based on resources, and information 
asymmetries (Kendall and Knapp, 2000). Resource holders demanding social impact 
evaluations are often remote from the beneficiary groups, and any information about the 
fate and views of beneficiaries is mediated by the organisation.  
 
Secondly, we emphasise the nature of the demand. In the context presented here the 
‘demand’ is represented by the practice of social impact evaluation. The study explores 
how demand is characterised by degrees of uncertainties that allow non-profit 
organisations to use ‘creative techniques of strategic decoupling’ (Hirsch & Bermiss, 
2009, p. 265), to subvert control exercised by resource holders. In the analysis we refer to 
the concepts of control, discomfort, resistance and discretion. These concepts express the 
nature of both relations and the demand put on organisations, and they describe the basis 
on which their responses are based. 
 
Methodology  
The data comes from qualitative interviews that addressed research questions concerning 
how organisations experience and act on pressure to conduct social impact evaluation, 
and how they conduct such evaluations including the reporting of results. Data was 
gathered from individuals that play key roles in making the decision of how and what to 
measure, such as chief executives, marketing and finance managers, or senior service 
delivery managers. The cases are all non-governmental, non-profit organisations, defined 
as those with restrictions on distributing assets to individuals, having social aims and 
being independent of the state. All cases had charitable legal status that requires them to 
state their public benefit each year.  
 
A theoretically informed non-probability purposive sampling process was used to 
produce a cross section of different sectors and sizes of organisations with a multiple case 
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study design (Yin, 2003).  Details of the case studies are provided below.  A sampling 
frame of organisations carrying out social impact reporting was built up following 
responses to a request put out by support organisations and on-line networks to their 
members. Starting with a sampling frame of 80 organisations in one of the nine regions of 
England, structured interviews were carried out with 32 third sector organisations. Within 
this group more detailed information was collected through open-ended interviews from 
14 detailed case studies. All respondents received detailed explanations of the purpose of 
the research and how the results would be kept anonymous.  
 
The interviews were carried out face to face, by the authors with additional interaction by 
telephone and email where necessary. An interview protocol was used which explored 
the motivations and challenges of using their social impact measurement and reporting 
approaches, with the opportunity for detailed probing on specific issues. The data 
collection also involved analysis of their evaluation reports where available, and material 
in the public domain (websites, articles, etc). Through cross-case comparison (Yin, 
2003), common issues were drawn out and attention given to any evidence that might 
refute emerging conclusions.   
 
To ensure analytical rigor, a further 10 organisations or individuals providing training in 
social impact measurement to organisations were also interviewed. This allowed an 
element of triangulation as they were involved in many of the evaluations completed by 
the case studies. Data were also collected on the issues raised by the attendees of two 
training courses on Social Impact Measurement, one covering Social Return On 
Investment  and one covering Social Accounting and Audit,  each of which had 12 
participants. Further triangulation was gained from reporting the early findings back to 
respondents and other organisations and seeking their views on whether it was an 
accurate reflection of their activities. 
 
While there is potential for bias from the small sample, validity and accuracy was derived 
from the use of a range of techniques including interviewing, documentary analysis of 
evaluation reports and informal discussions. Inter-rater reliability was ensured having 
both authors carrying out analysis on the same material. The research is only concerned 
with those currently reporting on their social impact and willing to discuss this sensitive 





Table I: The details of the case studies 
Case 
No 





1 Homeless support wanting to expand but requiring 
funding and planning permission 
23 SROI 
6 Tackling eating disorders funded by the health 
sector and donations 
30 SROI 
7 Employment support for the disabled and with large 
contracts from the Department of Work and 
Pensions 
100+ Own 
9 Funding organization that provides small grants 
after pooling individual donations and legacies 
11 SROI 
10 Supporting homeless through providing housing 
and recovery program, income generated from 
recycling business. 
11 SCBA and 
setting up own.  
11 Training in cooking to improve health, with funding 
from a single grant which ends soon. 
3 SOUL 
12 Training, employment and housing for ex-offenders 
with funding primarily from public sector contracts. 
40 Own 
13 Support for victims of crime 100 SOUL 
14 Housing for people with severe and enduring 
mental health problems funded through public 
sector grants and contracts.  
150 Own 
15 Creating partnerships between schools and 
businesses for work experience.  
12 SOUL, own  
17 Arranging yearly arts festival; Creative Partnership 
with schools; various arts projects.  
36 Own 
18 Supporting people with learning difficulties. 8 Own 
29 Support service for families and children at risk, 
counseling and working with children with 
behavioral problems 
7 Own 
30 Supporting voluntary sector, placing volunteers, 
lobbying 
90 Own  
 
 
Context: social impact measurement and new welfare policies in the UK 
In the context of non-profit organisations measurements and evaluations have taken on 
different roles over time (Barman, 2007), and it is therefore important to recognize the 
context in which the case study organisations operate. The impetus to focus on social 
impact measurement among non-profit organisations in the UK has recently increased 
through the introduction of new government policies (Department of Health, 2011; HM 
Government, 2012) that place greater emphasis on competition for contracts, user choice 
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and increased efficiency. Further impetus has come from philanthropic funders and grant 
makers wanting to demonstrate their own impact and use performance measures in their 
decision making related allocating funding. These resource holders also promote 
evaluation and social impact measurement as a way of encouraging learning and self 
reflection within organisations.  
 
As a consequence an array of new evaluation frameworks have emerged. Many of those 
are adapted from models of evaluation and accounting used in private and public 
organisational settings. The Social Return on Investment (SROI) method, introduced 
through a government sponsored project, is one such evaluation framework, which 
explicitly aims to mirror the private sector model of assessing return on investment with 
the reporting of a ratio of investment to financial values of social benefit (Nicholls et al, 
2008). Other approaches include Social Accounting and Audit (SAA), Balanced 
Scorecards, Triple Bottom Line accounting and Blended Value (Emerson, 2003). While 
some question whether frameworks based on the private sector experience are entirely 
suitable, others argue that unless organisations use frameworks and language that are 
recognised by the wider system of decision-making in our mixed economy of welfare, the 
value and achievements of social purpose organisations will not be acknowledged 
(Gibbon & Dey, 2011). There are also tensions around methods used in evaluations 
where for example some favour statistics and ‘objective indicators over ‘subjective’ case 
studies (Hall, 2012). Debates furthermore focus on the use of market based language to 
express the achievements of non-profit organisations (Gibbon & Dey, 2011), what role 
evaluations should play in the commissioning of contracts (Jones & Liddle, 2011), the 
standardisation of social impact reporting (“Principles into Practice”, 2012).    
  
Findings  
The findings provide important insights into how the studied organisations experience a 
situation of increasing demands for social impact evaluations. They reveal compliance, 
rejection, and organisations come to use evaluations as a strategy to promote their work. 
The nature of relationships with outside stakeholders, and the nature of social impact 
evaluation inform the way social purpose organisations engage in strategic decoupling.  
Power and pressure from outside 
The organisations measuring impact suggested a range of motivations for doing so. There 
was an overwhelming reference to outside stakeholders imposing demands. Pressure 
from agencies and public sector commissioners was cited as most important (stated by 19 
of the 32 interviewees). Such pressure comes through requirements of social impact data 
in applications for grants as well as requirements that organisations collect such evidence 
once they have received funding. For organisations delivering public service contracts 
evaluations and social impact measurement are seen as necessary elements in meeting the 
requirements stipulated as directives by the resource holders.  
 
Organisations reported that they had recently noticed a marked change in how private 
funders, public sector commissioners, and grant making bodies talk about social impact 
and evaluations. An established organisation working with ex-offenders noted that ‘There 
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has been a big push from funders such as the Big Lottery’ and the CEO noted that ‘it’s a 
challenge to deal with the new term ‘social impact’ that authorities are talking about 
now. And we know that in the near future the local authorities will require us to use a 
particular evaluation tool. Before, they have specified what information they want but 
now they also specify what tools we should use’ (case 12). 
 
Motivations to conduct some level of social impact measurement reveal explicit 
directives from resource holders, but this pressure also has a more implicit source. 
Organisations find themselves in an environment that is based on new types of contracts 
and relationships, characterised by competition. Detailed evidence of social impact is 
seen as a necessity and there are norms emerging related to expectations of funders and 
commissioners.  This is clearly expressed by a large charity delivering government 
funded support for the unemployed, who found that evidence of social impact was needed 
because ‘we are up against national and international organisations when bidding for 
work so if we are close to their price but we can show all these added benefits … We see 
ourselves as a charity that runs as a business… it is not enough to have a good mission... 
we need rock hard evidence so this forces us to be more businesslike’ (case 7). The 
interviewee continued by explaining that before they could be ‘a bit airy fairy’ when 
discussing achievements, as opposed to ‘now you need more than a picture of a smiley 
face’.   
 
Other cases expressed similar views and reported that social impact measurement is 
essential in justifying the cost of their services to resource providers and in gaining 
credibility as a professionally run organisation in an environment where for-profit and 
not-for-profit organisations are competing for the same contracts. Organisations clearly 
describe themselves as being at the receiving end of a request posed by individual 
funding bodies as well as by a general climate that favours evidence of achievements.  
Internal discomfort 
We can detect different sources of discomfort in the way our interviewees experience the 
pressure for them to conduct impact evaluation. Organisations expressed discomfort with 
being controlled by outside stakeholders who demand information on how the 
organisation is operating and what it is achieving. But there was also discomfort and 
resistance that caused tensions within the organisation. While senior staff tended to 
support social impact measurement, comprehensive assessment exercises caused protests 
and internal tensions.  
 
Staff would resist being managed in this way, and one manager described how ‘it was 
like pulling teeth’ (case 6) and the regional manager of another organisations stated that 
‘staff are different here… they have to be treated with cotton gloves......many of them 
think that ‘I have done like this for 15 years, there is no need to change!’ It is because of 
a feeling of ownership, that they have initiated activities, and they don’t want to change 
on anyone else’s initiative’ (case 13). This senior manager continued to explain that staff 
resist as a matter of principle: they do not want to be supervised. The manager also 
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believed that staff disagree with accepting funders’ requests and that behind the drive 
towards evaluations lies a drive to make money. He had noticed a clear change though, as 
the organisation adapted to the new environment and began to engage with devising their 
own tools for measuring impact. Staff at all levels became familiar with the new 
procedures: ‘They are just insecure and feel uncomfortable about change. The challenge 
is internal organisational culture. Two to three years ago there was definitely some 
resistance... but ideas have percolated and staff are beginning to get what this is all 
about. Still some resist as a matter of principle’ (case 13).  
 As the measurement procedures become embedded within the organisations, staff began 
to express further discomfort about the impact on organisational relations. In one case, 
the organisation was meant to ask clients to fill in a lengthy questionnaire (case 11). 
Since staff felt it inappropriate to pressure clients, often with poor literacy skills, to deal 
with such a task, they managed to negotiate funders to agree with an alternative way of 
assessing their work. Several others described how they feared the evaluation tool would 
disturb relations with clients (case 29), were intrusive (case 14), used inappropriate 
language (case 18), and requested data that they could not obtain for ethical reasons (case 
12). 
 
Impact evaluation for promotion  
However, analysis of the cases shows that eleven of the fourteen cases were also using 
the impact measurement and evaluation process for purposes other than reporting to 
funders and learning within the organisation. Information based on social impact 
measurement was used to gain the attention of future possible funders and also used to 
attract donations from new groups (individuals, philanthropists). A small foundation 
giving grants to other small third sector organisations had invested in a ‘Social Return on 
Investment’ evaluation, i.e. a type of cost-benefit analysis of their services, and used the 
report for attracting donations:  ‘We are here and we are good, so how can we show it? 
Philanthropy of people often goes to organisations they are linked to, like cancer or 
cuddly animals, but if we can show added value then…’ (case 9). Whereas organisations 
have previously used a combination of persuasion and personal contacts to secure 
resources, impact measurement was reported to be an increasingly an important 
additional tool in this process: ‘if we have data we have the facts and figures … it sets you 
apart from other organisations, it’s a strength’ (case 6).  
 
Social impact measurement complements an existing strategy based on personal contacts 
and networking that aims at getting the attention of resource holders. In this sense it is not 
seen as a threat, but rather as a welcomed additional tool. Analysis shows how complying 
with an agenda set by outside stakeholders can lead to initial discomfort and resistance, 
followed by acceptance. One children’s support organisation stated: ‘We have been asked 
to use this (impact tool) by authorities ....I thought at first “What a waste! Just a lot of 
paper with no value!”. The very same manager then goes on to say: ‘But now I have 
changed. It has made us change what we do and how we do it, as a response to the 
evaluations we do now’ (case 29). Initial resistance has been replaced by compliance and 
agreement. It has become embedded in several dimensions of organisational operations. 
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The evaluation is not just a task carried out by a particular group of staff (managers) at 
specific points in time, but has become part and parcel of organizational activities and 
engages staffs that are involved at the interface with service users. One organisation (case 
30) was explicit about the dual function of impact evaluation.  Data produced from 
formal measurements and evaluations is used to persuade resource holders: this is an 
important and external audience. Evaluations are also used for internal management to 
‘boost the morale of staff’.  
 
Creating space for discretion in social impact measurement 
The findings show how there is discretion in what is measured and organisations can 
therefore shape the evaluation process to meet other objectives. By discretion we mean a 
space for organisations to make choices about what to measure, how to measure, and in 
some cases what value to attribute to costs and outcomes. This is the source of ambiguous 
views on impact evaluations: the controlling qualities caused resistance, and the 
discretion proved to be a motivation for organisations to engage with the evaluation. 
 
The discretion embedded in evaluation procedures is due to the lack of consistency or 
agreement on what counts as good social impact evidence (Arvidson, Lyon, MacKay and 
Moro, 2013; Hall, 2012; Hall and Arvidson, 2013). The indicators and evidence chosen 
to evaluate social impact can be highly subjective. The selection of suitable indicators is a 
particular challenge for those organisations that are using evaluation frameworks that 
monetise social impact, such as Social Return on Investment (SROI) which is based on a 
cost-benefit analysis approach. Such evaluations rely on existing data (i.e. data that pre-
dates the start of the evaluation process) and data that are easily quantifiable. One 
organisation (case 1) using SROI explained: ‘we have some [indicators] but she [the 
consultant] wanted some [indicators]  like the impact on Accident and Emergency… she 
encouraged us as that is where we can get financial information’ .  
 
There is scepticism about the value of evaluations based on frameworks that allow 
organisations with a vested interest to make such a choice. The discretion is a space 
where organisations can be creative and formulate their own evaluation template. They 
are then able to disseminate and present findings in the way they feel comfortable with 
and that suits their needs.  
 
An evaluation has a ritualistic, symbolic value that is believed to prove the organisation 
to be professional. One organisation (case 9) was very clear about the effect of using the 
results of the evaluation they had undertaken: ‘The headline figure is what is quoted and 
what we are interested in... so it is marketing but marketing with teeth. We use it to death 
and quote it all the time...in our brochures, on our complement slips, in our applications. 
.. people want to see the outcomes of the research, not the research itself. It validates our 
work.’ Measures based on financial values were seen as providing particularly powerful 
messages. Although somewhat sceptical about the meaning of financial ratios and 
quantitative data in the context of understanding social impact, organisations wanted to 
present the results for marketing purposes. This affected the way organisations made 
strategies regarding the nature of the information they would include in reports.   
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An external evaluator of the case based at a university, was concerned that ‘it was only 
the summary that was published, and there was so much fuss about being able to produce 
the numbers that show the great work they are doing… they were not interested or keen 
in having this (the full report) widely published’. The strategy behind the reporting of this 
particular social impact evaluation was interesting (case 10). The cost-benefit analysis 
included interviews with clients. These case-studies brought to the front the difficulties in 
addressing complex social problems, that it involves multiple agencies, and that any 
evidence that claims a cause-and-effect relation between a specific intervention and 
social impact could be highly contentious. In a glossy brochure the organisation 
published the final findings of the evaluation, emphasising the impressive return-on-
investment their work generated. A second report, containing case-studies, was published 
online in a location unlikely to be found without direction.  
 
Using results selectively to present different stories to different audiences was made 
particularly explicit in the following quote by one interviewee who stated: ‘There are 
different things to prove to different people… we had to mix and match those different 
things. We are quite frank about all those different things but had to recognize different 
agendas and different expectations in terms of demonstrating what we did.’ (case 1). 
Such approaches to impression management play a central role in strengthening the 
position and legitimacy of organisations.  
 
Discussion  
We have described how organisations experience and respond to recent pressure to 
provide evidence of achievements based on social impact measurements. The cross-case 
analysis of the material reveal debates within organisations about the role, use, and effect 
of evaluations, and how social impact measurement can be used to mediate control and 
power in organisations’ relationships with resource holders. We find that both discomfort 
and enthusiasm can be used to describe these debates. Interestingly, these two opposing 
emotions cannot be used as a basis for dividing organisations into two camps, one 
characterised by strong resistance, and another by organisations engaging with social 
impact measurement. Rather the experience of engaging in social impact measurement 
and reporting generate both discomfort and enthusiasm.  
 
The concept of decoupling, the loose connection between an organisation’s formal 
strategy and its actual actions (Weick, 1976), suitably describes a range of strategies used 
by non-profit organisations to handle pressure to comply with social auditing regimes. In 
the literature review on the concept we furthermore identified both defensive (Levay and 
Waks, 2010) and proactive qualities in decoupling as a strategic response (Hirsch and 
Bermiss, 2009). By applying the concept on the behaviour of non-profit organisations the 
study contributes on two accounts. Firstly, it directs focus to organizational agency and 
thereby questions isomorphism and an implicit view of organisations as passive 
responders to directives from resource holders (Verbruggen et al., 2011; Burger & 
Owens, 2010). Secondly, the study contributes with a detailed understanding of responses 
to competing demands. We suggest two key points that supports a more precise model of 
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what informs the way non-profit organisations respond to demands for social impact 
auditing. The nature of relationships with resource holders is characterised by 
asymmetries of power based on resources and access to information. Furthermore, the 
nature of social impact evaluation offers room for manoeuvre that allows organisations to 
manipulate the way evaluations are carried out and information is presented.  
 
This paper explores the processes underlying decoupling and we show how organisations 
make different strategic choices in response to their external environment. This is shown 
in figure 1 below. Decoupling can be used to subvert control exerted by resource holders. 
Decoupling also exposes relations of power: it is used to appease stakeholders and to 
prevent potentially damaging conflicts. It is used by organisations to influence and co-
opt, rather than overtly defy and reject demands. By applying decoupling as an analytical 
tool in this way the study contributes both to our understanding of the behaviour of non-
profit organisations in this context, and to theories of decoupling.   
 








Compliance with requests to conduct impact evaluations can be based on an acceptance 
of directives and internalisation of norms within an organisation.  This can be seen in 
figure 1, where strategy 1 represents those organisations that comply and accept the 
directives coming from resource holders.  A second response (strategy 2) is a simple 
outright rejection of the need to measure social impact, particularly when organisations 
have greater financial independence or more control over resources. In such cases they 
may have no need to seek resources from those demanding social impact measurements.  
 
The third response is more interesting and shows evidence of types of decoupling. Where 
there is an element of resistance and reluctance to respond to a directive, there can be 
symbolic compliance with minimal reporting. Organisations see the performance 
measurement as an identity threat since the basis on which measurement is carried out 
does not tally with organisational values and logics: ‘Financial and non-financial 








Resistance and reluctant 
compliance (3) 
Rejection of 
directive (2)  
Acceptance after 
resistance (4) 
Proactive use for 
marketing (5) 
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Nevertheless, by complying they can ascertain that relations with resource holders are not 
disturbed.  
 
In such cases, social impact measurement is seen as an additional burden or ‘red tape’ 
rather than a useful set of tools that can be embedded in actual strategies of non-profit 
organisations. Social impact reporting is seen as a requirement to gain access to resources 
and as a means to satisfy stakeholders based on a minimal level of compliance. It is there 
a symbolic tool that is used to signify that the organisation is professional and open to 
scrutiny. 
 
This study also identifies a forth response (strategy 4) where there is a shift to greater 
acceptance after initial resistance. Organisations that have engaged with social impact 
evaluation for some time begin to appreciate the value of this exercise to the organisation 
itself. Managers see how they can use it to encourage performance among its staff, and 
how evaluation results lead to some reconsidering the use of resources and strategies 
within the organisation: there are incentives to embed evaluation procedures in the 
organisation. As a result of engaging in social impact measurement, managers begin to 
learn more about how this exercise offers ways of protecting the organisation from 
outside control. However, there may continue to be a disjuncture between the objectives 
of leadership and other staff.  
 
Figure 1 finally shows a fifth strategy, where there is proactive use of an organisations 
own discretion. Organisations symbolically adopt the practices of social impact 
measurement and use it to implement alternative strategies, particularly those related to 
marketing their own organisation. These organisations may accept the use of tools 
designed to provide accountability to funders or for organisational learning, but then use 
them for alternative purposes such as comparing themselves to other organisations in 
order to attract more resources. The social impact measurement approaches are not 
designed to be used for comparative purposes (as they do not have consistent 
methodologies) but the competitive environment means that setting an organisation apart 
from others and demonstrating competitive advantage is an important motivation  and 
justification for allocating an organisation’s own resources to the measurement process.   
 
Decoupling as used by the case study organisations reveals a creative process, 
characterised by agency and critical reflection much like ‘strategic decoupling’ described 
by Hirsch & Bermiss (2009). Social impact measurement becomes a marketing tool and a 
means to ‘set your organisation apart’ from other organisations that have not yet mastered 
impact evaluation; it becomes an identity marker rather than an identity threat.  
 
The proactive decoupling strategy is based on an engagement with the impact evaluation 
but one that is determined by organisations themselves. By simultaneously understanding 
the intricacies of social impact measurement and the context in which it is used, 
organisations can use their discretion to shape the evaluation process and use evaluations 
to promote their organisation. This gives them opportunities to prevent their organisation 
from being exposed to outside forces they cannot control, and to protect it from 




The results of this study show how social purpose organisations experience and respond 
to the pressure to conduct social impact evaluations. There is unease about what and how 
things are measured and how this interferes with organisational operations and values 
(Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006; Townley, 2011; Turco, 2012). This paper shows that 
there is resistance to the directives and demands of funders. Our analysis brings to the 
fore how organisations critically reflect on what social impact measurement means to 
them and how they consequently develop strategies to deal with these requests. 
Reflections reveal how organisations consider how they can balance the need to comply 
in order to gain legitimacy, status, and comparative advantages in a new and competitive 
climate, but also a need to resist the power and control exercised by outsiders from 
undermining their independence.  
 
Theories of decoupling can explain how organisations may respond to resource holders’ 
demands while resisting to fully comply with these demands. However, this paper 
develops the theory of decoupling by examining the agency of organisations and their 
ability to use evaluations for alternative approaches, beyond satisfying resource holders 
and internal learning. We refer to this as proactive or strategic decoupling. What 
characterises the proactive and strategic decoupling as used by the non-profit 
organisations is how it both subverts and confirms power-relations. The ambivalence and 
tensions expressed by organisations reveal a great deal of the changes in organisational 
fields, of the nature of relationships and that of evaluation frameworks.  
 
The analysis distinguishes different organisational responses to the discomfort raised by 
external demands for impact evaluation. It points at two key issues to take into account 
when exploring what underline these responses: the nature of relationships with outside 
stakeholders, and the nature of the demand (Pache and Santos, 2010) here defined as 
social impact evaluations. There is much scope to explore further issues here to arrive at 
more specific models of responses. There are also questions concerning the sustainability 
of strategic decoupling that may seek to explore how it affects relations with external 
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